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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
KENNETH B. ELLIS, : Case No. 970294-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This appeal is from a judgment and conviction for Theft 
from a Person, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-412 (Supp. 1997), in the Third Judicial District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Stephen Henriod and the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, Judges, 
presiding. Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue: Did the trial court err in denying Ellis' Motion 
to Continue where material evidence was discovered the morning of 
the last day of trial? 
Standard of Review: A trial court's decision to grant or 
deny a continuance is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See 
State v. Oliver, 820 P.2d 474, 476 (Utah App. 1991), cert, 
denied, 843 P.2d 516 (1992). 
STATUTES 
The statutes determinative of the issues on appeal are as 
follows: 
Theft - Elements, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1995) : 
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises 
unauthorized control over the property of another with a 
purpose to deprive him thereof. 
Theft From A Person, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 (Supp. 
1997): 
(1) Theft of property and services as provided in this 
chapter shall be punishable: 
(a) as a felony of the second degree if the . . .(iv) 
property is stolen from the person of another; 
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT 
Appellant's Motion to Continue based on newly discovered 
evidence is preserved on the record for appeal ("R.") at 137. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Appellant Kenneth Ellis ("Ellis") was charged by 
information with one count of theft from a person in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412. R.4. Ellis entered a not guilty plea 
and was tried before a jury along with his codefendant, Tommy 
Carter ("Carter"). R.13-14. On the morning of the last day of 
trial, after both parties rested but before the jury went into 
deliberation, Ellis moved for a continuance based on newly 
discovered information. R.40,137. The trial court denied the 
motion and the case proceeded. Id. The jury found Ellis and 
Carter guilty as charged. R.3 6,69. Ellis appeals from that 
conviction. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Ellis and Carter were charged with theft of money from 
the person of the complainant Joshua Irvin ("Irvin") in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412. R.4. The facts giving rise to 
2 
this case are in dispute. 
Ellis and Carter were longtime friends who had not seen 
each other for some time when they coincidentally met at the same 
bus stop in front of the Main Street entrance to Crossroads Plaza 
in downtown Salt Lake while waiting for their respective busses. 
R.135 [139,149,206-08] . The two men were talking and had decided 
to go get a beer when Carter spied Irvin walking by. R.135 [140-
41,208-09] . Carter sensed that Irvin was in the market for drugs 
and so approached Irvin. R.135[141,156]. Carter and Irvin began 
to talk. R.135 [141]. Carter indicated that he could take Irvin 
to someone who could supply marijuana. Id. Irvin agreed and 
gave Carter approximately thirteen dollars. Id. Ellis was not 
privy to the deal and did not know Irvin. R.135[149,210,213]. 
Ellis nonetheless followed behind Carter and Irvin as they walked 
through the mall and then along the street in a northwest 
direction toward the supplier's house. R.135[143,149,209]. 
Ellis also saw Irvin give an indeterminate amount of cash money 
to Carter. R.135[210]. 
After a few blocks, Irvin started to complain of the 
distance. R.135[144]. Carter did not tell Irvin the exact 
distance, but later explained at trial that the supplier was 
about fifteen blocks from Crossroads Plaza. R. 135 [144,176,179-
8 0] . Irvin became agitated and said, "I know what you guys are 
going to do. I'm going to get you niggers!" R.13 5[144-45]. 
Irvin ran off, leaving his money with Carter. Id. 
Carter and Ellis went to a nearby convenience store and 
3 
bought beer using some of Irvin's money. R.135[145,214]. Ellis 
and Carter then proceeded to the Greyhound bus station where they 
sat on a wall and drank the beer. R.135[145,214]. 
At trial, Irvin denied the drug deal, noting that it was 
not his "usual practice" to buy drugs from strangers. R. 
134 [15,25] . He also denied that he used marijuana. R.134 [25] . 
Instead, Irvin stated that he was around 50 North, 200 West in 
downtown Salt Lake City awaiting a bus to his home in West 
Valley. R.134[l]. Although he normally waited at a bus stop in 
front of Crossroads Plaza on Main Street, this day he was thirsty 
and so chose a stop on North Temple near a convenience store 
where he could buy a drink. R.134[18]. 
Irvin testified that he was walking toward the 
convenience store when Ellis and Carter approached from behind. 
R.134 [5-6,44] . Ellis distracted Irvin while Carter picked his 
front pants pocket and took approximately thirteen dollars cash. 
Id. Ellis and Carter then "trotted" off. R.134[9]. Irvin 
stated that he initially decided not to report the theft but 
then, feeling "victimized," called 911 from a nearby motel lobby. 
R.134 [10-11] . 
According to Officers Melody Gray ("Gray") and Todd 
Mitchell ("Mitchell"), Mitchell received a dispatch from the 911 
operator regarding a "strong arm" robbery on North Temple. R. 
134 [53] . The operator indicated to Mitchell that Irvin was 
waiting for them at the motel and that he alleged that Ellis and 
Carter robbed money from him. R.134[65-66]. Gray was yet 
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unaware that money was stolen. R.134[61-62]. 
Mitchell and Gray met Irvin at the motel. R.134[55]. 
Irvin pointed in the direction that Ellis and Carter fled. 
R.134 [55,61] . Mitchell and Gray proceeded by bike in that 
direction and Irvin followed on foot. R.134[[15,66]. Within a 
few blocks, the officers came upon Ellis and Carter sitting on a 
wall in front of the Greyhound bus station. R.134[66-67]. Irvin 
identified them as his assailants. R.134[15]. 
Ellis and Carter did not attempt to flee, but appeared 
surprised as the officers approached and detained them. 
R.134 [63] . Mitchell spoke with Carter while Gray spoke with 
Ellis. R.134[56,67]. Ellis asked Gray what was going on. R. 
134 [57] . Without mentioning the allegedly stolen cash, Gray 
explained that they were theft suspects. Id. Ellis voluntarily 
and repeatedly stated that he did not take the money. Id. Gray 
then turned the investigation over to Mitchell, who mirandized 
Ellis and Carter individually. R. 134 [59] . 
Mitchell began questioning Ellis and Carter. R. 134 [68] . 
Ellis explained that he saw Irvin give the money to Carter, that 
he did not know Irvin, and that he never touched Irvin7s person. 
R.134 [68], R.135[84] . Ellis never referred to Irvin by name as 
he spoke with Mitchell. R.134[68]. Mitchell searched Carter's 
pants pockets and found a ten-dollar bill and some change. R. 
135 [86-87] . Irvin witnessed this and asked if he would get his 
money back. Id. Mitchell asked Irvin to leave. R.134[67]. 
Carter then voluntarily stated that the events did not occur as 
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Irvin described them. R.134[70]. Mitchell arrested Ellis and 
Carter and took them to jail. R.134[72]. 
Ellis was detained in jail during trial. On the morning 
of the last day of trial, Ellis discovered that a fellow inmate 
was an acquaintance of Irvin. R.137[2]. The inmate, Brian Meek 
("Meek"), indicated that he saw Irvin use methamphetamine in the 
past. R.137[2]. Ellis notified his attorney and the trial court 
that same morning before trial was to resume. Id. Upon the 
trial court's instruction, Ellis' attorney spoke with Meek at the 
jail. Id. Meek elaborated that he knew Irvin from high school, 
that he had seen him use methamphetamine within the past two 
years, and that he was aware that Irvin owed money to another 
friend for prior drug deals. R.13 7[3]. 
Based on this newly discovered information, Ellis moved 
for a continuance. R.137[2]. At that point in trial, both 
parties had rested but the jury was not yet in deliberation. 
Ellis explained to the court that he needed time to explore 
Meck's assertions. R.137[3-4]. Ellis noted that Meck's 
statements were material to his defense in that they contradicted 
Irvin's claims that he did not engage in drug deals with 
strangers and that he did not use drugs. R.137[2]. The trial 
court denied Ellis' motion without explanation on the record. R. 
137 [4] . 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in denying Ellis' motion for a 
continuance. The newly discovered statements of Meek were 
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admissible and material to Ellis' defense. Moreover, Meek could 
have been produced to testify within a reasonable time and 
without undue delay of the proceedings. Ellis also exercised due 
diligence in preparation for his trial and could not have 
otherwise discovered Meck's statements absent Meck's own 
disclosures. Ellis respectfully requests this Court to reverse 
and remand for a new trial since, in addition to the foregoing, 
Ellis was materially prejudiced by the trial court's denial of 
the continuance or, alternatively, since the outcome of his trial 
would have been different had the continuance been granted. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING ELLIS' MOTION TO 
CONTINUE UPON NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE. 
The trial court erred in denying Ellis' motion to continue 
where Meck's newly discovered statements were admissible and 
material to Ellis' defense. Meek would testify that Irvin used 
methamphetamine in the past and that he owes money to another for 
prior drug deals. R.137[2-4]. Ellis asserts as his defense that 
Irvin was not robbed, but rather that Irvin and Carter entered 
into a drug deal in which Irvin gave the allegedly stolen money 
to Carter and then surrendered it when he left in a fit of anger. 
R.135 [138-234] . To this end, Meck's statements would provide 
material evidence in support of Ellis' defense theory, as well as 
impeach Irvin's claims that he does not use marijuana and that he 
did not strike a deal with Carter since it is not his "usual 
practice" to deal with strangers. 
A trial court errs in denying a request for a continuance 
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when the moving party adequately establishes that "denial of the 
motion will prevent the party from obtaining material and 
admissible evidence, that any additional witnesses it seeks can 
be produced within a reasonable time, and that it has exercised 
due diligence in preparing the case before requesting the 
continuance." Oliver, 820 P.2d at 476. Ellis made the requisite 
showing under Oliver and is therefore entitled to a continuance. 
A. Ellis Established That Denial Of The Continuance Would 
Prevent Him From Obtaining Material And Admissible 
Evidence. 
Pursuant to Oliver and as the moving party, Ellis adequately 
established that denial of a continuance would prevent him from 
obtaining material and admissible evidence. 820 P.2d at 4 76. 
Irvin alleges that Ellis and Carter acted in concert to rob him 
of approximately thirteen dollars. R.134[5-10]. As his defense, 
Ellis asserts that Irvin and Carter entered into a drug deal to 
which Ellis was not a party, Irvin gave Carter thirteen dollars 
for marijuana and then surrendered the money when he left in a 
fit of anger. R.135[138-234]. Upon cross-examination, Irvin 
denied the drug deal and that he uses marijuana. R.134[25]. 
Meck's statements provide substantive evidence in support of 
Ellis' defense theory, as well as impeach Irvin's denial of a 
drug deal and marijuana use. Specifically, Meek indicated that 
he saw Irvin use methamphetamine two years prior to Ellis' trial. 
R.137[3]. Meek also indicated that Irvin owed money to a friend 
for past drug deals. Id. As explained to the trial court by 
Ellis' attorney, 
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[T]his is new information that may be important to the case; 
. . . Mr. Irvin indicated that he doesn't use drugs in his 
testimony. He also indicated that . . . his usual practice 
is not to buy drugs from strangers . . . [I]f we were to 
find the person who he owes money to for drugs, . . . that 
would impeach [Irvin's] statement. . . . [We are] asking the 
Court to give us some time to investigate this better. 
R.137[3] . 
Meck's statements are "material" for purposes of Oliver 
because they provide independent evidence in support of Ellis' 
defense theory that Irvin was a party to the drug deal with 
Carter. First, Meck's statements would establish that Irvin has 
used drugs in the past and, therefore, was inclined to use 
marijuana at the time of the alleged robbery. Meek personally 
observed Irvin use methamphetamine at least two years prior to 
Ellis' trial. R.137[3]. While Irvin denied marijuana use, he 
did admit during cross-examination that he possessed marijuana 
paraphernalia in 1990. R.134[25-26]. In light of the foregoing, 
Meck's statement would go to Irvin's inclination to use drugs in 
general, including methamphetamine, and the likelihood that he 
sought marijuana on this occasion. 
In addition to confirming Irvin's use of drugs, Meck's 
statements would further establish that Irvin was inclined to 
purchase drugs and, therefore, was a party to the drug deal with 
Carter as Ellis asserts. Irvin claimed that he did not strike a 
deal with Carter since it is not his "usual practice" to buy 
drugs from strangers. R.134[25]. Meek, however, indicated that 
Irvin owed money to one of Meck's friends for past drug deals. 
R.137[3]. Further investigation of Meck's statement would reveal 
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the identity of Irvin's alleged supplier and whether he was a 
friend or a stranger to Irvin prior to their drug dealing 
relationship. Such information would also establish the 
likelihood that Irvin would seek drugs from unknown sources. In 
turn, this information would bolster Ellis' defense theory that 
Irvin was inclined to buy drugs from anyone in the business of 
selling them, including Carter, and, in fact, struck a deal which 
went bad and eventually led to the robbery allegations. Instead, 
Ellis could show that Irvin may, in fact, solicit drugs from 
anyone in the business of selling them, including Carter. 
Without benefit of the continuance however, the trial court 
prevented Ellis from obtaining and presenting material evidence 
establishing Irvin's history of drug use and his purchasing 
habit. 
The materiality of Meck's statements in this instance is 
bolstered by the fact that the existence of a drug deal itself is 
a contested, "'vital point'11 and there is no other 
11
'disinterested testimony'" regarding the matter. State v. 
Duncan, 132 P.2d 121, 125 (Utah 1942) (quoting Jensen v. Logan 
City, 57 P.2d 708, 723 (Utah 1936)). In the analogous context of 
a request for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence1, 
1
 Whether a new trial is warranted based on newly 
discovered evidence depends upon criteria that are similar to 
those considered in determining the necessity of a continuance. 
A new trial is merited where: (1) the new evidence could not have 
been discovered through reasonable diligence; (2) it is not 
merely cumulative; and (3) it would render a different trial 
outcome. See State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 793 (Utah 1991). 
Given the similarity between the analyses, a discussion of case 
law concerning requests for a new trial is instructive to the 
10 
several Utah cases note that a new trial is appropriate where the 
"newly discovered evidence [] clarif[ies] a fact that was 
contested and resolved against the movant." State v. Becker, 803 
P. 2d 1290, 1293 (Utah App. 1990)2. The Utah Supreme Court 
explained that justice and the pursuit of truth requires the 
court to grant a new trial where new evidence is material and the 
evidence going to a contested issue is otherwise lacking. 
Where disinterested testimony on the vital point in a case 
is very scant, . . . and it appears that [newly discovered 
testimony on that point] would change the result, a new 
trial should be granted. While the granting or refusing of 
the motion lies in the sound discretion of the court, where 
there is a grave suspicion that justice may have miscarried 
because of the lack of enlightenment on a vital point which 
new evidence will apparently supply, and the other elements 
attendant on obtaining a new trial on the ground of newly 
discovered evidence are present, it would be an abuse of 
sound discretion not to grant the same. 
Jensen, 57 P.2d at 723. 
The fact that Meck's statements incidentally serve to 
impeach Irvin does not detract from their materiality or the need 
for a continuance in this case. See State v. Creviston, 646 P.2d 
750, 753 (Utah 1982)(continuance not warranted where new evidence 
is for impeachment alone); see also Becker, 803 P.2d at 1294 (new 
present issue. 
2
 See also James, 819 P.2d at 794 (new trial required where 
newly discovered testimony, indicating that key prosecution 
witness perjured himself, established independent evidence in 
support of defendant's theory that witness committed perjury to 
subvert trial to gain more lenient treatment in his own trial to 
follow); State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 198-99 (Utah 1987) (new 
trial appropriate where new evidence suggested that victims, who 
alleged that defendant forced them to stroke his penis until he 
ejaculated, actually observed their mother having intercourse 
with her boyfriend; new evidence would explain testimony of 
victims and corroborate defendant's defense theory). 
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trial not warranted where new evidence only has impeachment 
value). In State v. James, 819 P.2d 781 (Utah 1991), the Utah 
Supreme Court held that although newly discovered evidence went 
to the credibility of a key opposing witness, a new trial was 
nonetheless required since the new evidence was independent, 
corroborated the defendant's defense theory, and "concerned a 
disputed fact that arose between [the key witness] and [the 
defendant.]" Id. at 794. In that case, the defendant was 
convicted based primarily on the testimony of the key witness, a 
fellow inmate, who testified that he overheard defendant confess 
the murder of the victim to another. Id. at 787. The key 
witness offered the testimony in exchange for more lenient 
treatment in his own trial. Id. at 794. After the close of 
trial, yet another inmate informed the defendant that the key 
witness perjured himself and lied about defendant's confession. 
Id. The Supreme Court held that this new information warranted a 
new trial. The Court reasoned that the "[e]vidence from a 
neutral third party is not merely cumulative. . . . It is of a 
different kind and nature than defendant's statements, and it 
certainly could have a different quality in the eyes of the 
jurors who assess the credibility of the witnesses." Id. 
Meck's statements are similar to the newly discovered 
evidence at issue in James in that they add more than impeachment 
value to the truth-finding process of Ellis' trial. Id.; see 
also Duncan, 132 P.2d at 125 ("purpose of trial is to obtain the 
facts" and prevent "miscarriage of justice"). First, Meek is a 
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"neutral third party" with no interest in the outcome of Ellis' 
trial. The record does not indicate that Meek was offered 
lenient treatment for his testimony. See James, 819 P.2d at 794 
(key witness' had interest in perjuring himself at defendant's 
trial since he was offered more lenient treatment in exchange for 
incriminating testimony). Moreover, Meek and Ellis did not know 
one another, hence it cannot be said that Meek sought to help out 
a friend by providing false information. Meek also did not know 
Irvin well enough to harbor any animosity toward him and lie to 
hurt him. In fact, Meek had not seen Irvin in two years and was 
only a casual acquaintance of Irvin from high school. R.137[2-
3]. Hence, Meek was a disinterested source of material 
information. 
In addition to their neutrality, Meck's statements 
substantiate Ellis' defense theory, namely the existence of a 
drug deal between Irvin and Carter. The evidence going to the 
critical issue of the drug deal consists solely of Irvin's word 
against that of Carter and Ellis. By definition, therefore, the 
evidence before the jury was not objective. Indeed, the 
likelihood that Irvin's testimony was biased is even greater 
considering the uncomfortable position he would be in if he 
admitted to the police and, later, the court that he was involved 
in a drug deal. Meck's statements, by contrast, provide unbiased 
evidence of the drug deal. Hence, the fact that they tend to 
impeach Irvin as well does not detract from their materiality and 
the subsequent need for a continuance in this case. 
13 
With regard to requests for continuances in light of newly 
discovered information, this Court has twice held that a 
continuance is not merited where the information sought is 
duplicative or available through alternative witnesses or 
documents. In Holbrook v. Master Protection Corp., 883 P.2d 295 
(Utah App. 1994), the defendant sought a continuance in order to 
access documents prepared by the opposing party that summarized 
information already possessed by the defendant. Id. at 299. The 
Court denied the continuance given that the information sought 
was duplicative and, therefore, the defendant would not be 
disadvantaged by the denial of the continuance. Id. 
The Court similarly held in State v. Horton, 848 P.2d 708 
(Utah App. 1993), cert, denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993), that 
the defendant was not entitled to a continuance since the 
testimony of the hoped-for witness, unavailable to testify due to 
surgery, was otherwise available through her sworn deposition. 
Id. at 715. Since the information was available to the defendant 
in an alternate form, the deposition, the Court found that the 
defendant "was not prevented from obtaining or presenting 
evidence." Id. 
Unlike the information at issue in Holbrook and Horton, the 
information available through Meek is not duplicative or 
available to Ellis through alternative witnesses or documents. 
Meck's statements were not included in a sworn affidavit. 
Moreover, no other witness or document approximated the 
information Meek could provide. Rather, the testimonies of Meek 
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and the supplier are the only independent evidence establishing 
Irvin's drug habits. Ellis could not demonstrate his defense 
that the money exchanged hands through a drug deal through any 
other evidence presented at trial or through examination of 
witnesses since no one observed the altercation. Given that the 
information provided through Meek and the supplier is not 
duplicative and cannot otherwise be substituted, Ellis was 
"prevented from obtaining or presenting evidence" that was 
material to his defense. Horton, 848 P.2d at 715. 
The Utah Supreme Court has also held that a continuance is 
not necessary if the content of the anticipated testimony is so 
"speculative" that a trial court could not "pass upon [its] 
materiality." Creviston, 646 P.2d at 752. In Creviston, the 
defendant's motion and supporting affidavit in support of the 
continuance did not describe the content of the anticipated 
testimony. Id. The absent witness, a codefendant who was 
scheduled to be tried separately at a later date, asserted her 
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and refused to 
divulge any information to the defendant until after her trial. 
Id. Consequently, the defendant admitted to the court that he 
"had no way of knowing how [his codefendant] would testify" and 
instead merely opined that her testimony would be "'vital711 and 
"'in his behalf.'" Id. The Supreme Court held that such a 
paucity of information did not provide a sufficient basis to 
determine the materiality of the hoped-for testimony. Id.; see 
also State v. Williams, 712 P.2d 220, 222 (Utah 1985) (no abuse 
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of discretion where trial court denied continuance based on 
speculative information where the defendant "had no idea" what 
absent witness would testify to). 
Unlike the defendant in Creviston, the content of the 
anticipated testimony of Meek is known and the trial court was 
able to assess its materiality. Meek himself indicated to both 
Ellis and Ellis' attorney that he knew Irvin and that he saw 
Irvin use methamphetamine. R.137[2-4]. Ellis' attorney relayed 
Meck's information to the trial court and explained its 
significance to Ellis' defense. Id. Hence, the trial court had 
ample information to "pass upon [its] materiality." Creviston, 
646 P.2d at 752. 
Ellis likewise made an adequate showing regarding the 
anticipated testimony of Irvin's supplier such that the trial 
court was able to assess its materiality. Id. In the absence of 
a continuance, Ellis did not have an opportunity to speak with 
the supplier personally and clarify the details of his or her 
anticipated testimony. Nonetheless, the anticipated testimony 
was narrowly characterized to the court: Meck's statement 
indicated, and Ellis' attorney explained, that the supplier would 
only testify regarding Irvin's drug purchases from him. R. 
137 [3] .3 Unlike the motion and affidavit in Creviston, where 
3
 This information would also give the added benefit of 
corroborating Meck's statements to the extent that it would 
verify his claims regarding Irvin. See, e.g., State v. Doyle, 
918 P.2d 141, 144 (Utah App. 1996), cert, denied, 925 P.2d 963 
(Utah 1996)(upholding validity of search warrant premised on 
information provided by citizen informant where informant's 
statements were corroborated by independent observations of 
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the anticipated information was broadly defined as "'vital,'" and 
could have, in fact touched upon any aspect of the defense, Ellis 
tied the scope of the supplier's anticipated statements to a 
certain subject matter. Such a narrow characterization of the 
testimony provided an adequate basis upon which the trial court 
could assess its materiality. Accordingly, Ellis' showing of 
materiality with regard to Meck's possible testimony is not so 
speculative that a continuance is not warranted in this case. 
Id. 
Based on the foregoing, Ellis adequately established that, 
absent the continuance, he would not be able to obtain material 
information. See, Oliver, 820 P.2d at 476. As noted by defense 
counsel at trial, the newly discovered information is material in 
that it substantiates Ellis' defense and is the only 
"disinterested" evidence going to an otherwise contested issue 
where the evidence is "scant." Jensen, 57 P.2d at 723; see also 
R. 137 [3]. Moreover, the information that Ellis seeks is not 
duplicative or available through alternative witnesses or 
documents. See Horton, 848 P.2d at 715; Holbrook, 883 P.2d at 
299. Finally, Ellis' showing of materiality and admissibility is 
not so speculative or duplicative that a continuance is not 
warranted here. See Creviston, 646 P.2d at 752. The content of 
the anticipated testimony of both Meek and the supplier is 
sufficiently defined such that the trial court could "pass upon 
police); State v. Brown, 798 P.2d 284, 286 (Utah App. 1990) 
(same). 
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[its] materiality." Id. Hence, denial of the continuance 
disadvantaged Ellis and "prevented him from obtaining or 
presenting [material] evidence." Horton, 848 P.2d at 715; see 
also Holbrook, 883 P.2d at 299. 
B. Ellis Established That Meek Could Be Produced Within A 
Reasonable Time. 
Ellis made an adequate showing that Meek could be produced 
within a reasonable time and without undue delay of the trial. 
Oliver, 820 P.2d at 476. Meek was a fellow inmate of Ellis, 
housed in the jail adjoining the court complex, and was, 
therefore, "reasonably available" as required by Oliver, 82 0 P.2d 
at 476; R. 137 [2] . Meck's accessibility is demonstrated by the 
fact that Ellis' attorney, upon the trial court's last minute 
request, was able to locate and speak with Meek personally and 
then return to the court that same morning, before trial was to 
resume, in order to argue Ellis' motion for a continuance. 
R.137[2] . Indeed, given the proximity and immediate 
accessibility of Meek, the State and Ellis could have feasibly 
ascertained all the information they needed to put Meek on the 
stand the same day that Ellis requested the continuance. Hence, 
Meek could have been produced without undue delay of the 
proceedings. See, Creviston, 646 P.2d at 753 (noting that months 
or years required to obtain hoped-for witness was unreasonable); 
Horton, 848 P.2d at 715 (six-to-eight-week projected recovery 
time of hoped-for witness was unreasonable). 
The fact that the jury was about to go into deliberation 
when Ellis moved for the continuance does not weigh against the 
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need for a continuance in this instance. In Duncan, the jury had 
already retired to deliberate when the defendant requested a new 
trial. 132 P.2d at 125. Given the importance of the newly 
discovered evidence, the Court noted that the jury ought to be 
recalled in the interests of justice. Id. 
The purpose of trial is to obtain the facts. If testimony 
is available which would tend to show the innocence of a 
defendant, the court and counsel for both sides should aid 
in the presentation of such testimony to prevent a 
miscarriage of justice. The jury should be aided in every 
reasonable manner to obtain all of the competent material 
and relevant facts essential to enable the jurors to 
determine the guilty or innocence of the accused. The mere fact the jury has retired to deliberate is unimportant if it 
becomes apparent the jurors did not receive all of the 
essential facts. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
Unlike the jury in Duncan, the jury in this case had not yet 
gone into deliberation; both parties had merely rested and the 
jury was instructed when Ellis moved for the continuance. Hence, 
the interruption to the proceeding assumes even less importance 
than that involved in Duncan. Since Meck's statements amounted 
to independent, corroborative evidence of a contested vital point 
(the existence of the drug deal), they were essential to the jury 
in determining Ellis7 guilt or innocence. See supra Point I.A. 
Under the circumstances, therefore, the trial court had the right 
to reopen the case in order that Ellis might be able to present 
essential information to the jury. Duncan, 132 P.2d at 125. 
With regard to Irvin's supplier, Meek did not indicate the 
supplier's identity or location during the brief interview with 
Ellis' attorney. R.137[2-4]. Hence, the supplier's availability 
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was undeterminable. However, this information was not relevant 
to the availability analysis at that juncture in the proceeding. 
Ellis requested the continuance precisely to investigate Meck's 
statements and determine, among other things, the identity and 
availability of the supplier; he could not have discovered such 
information absent the continuance. See, Creviston, 646 P.2d at 
753 (continuance not merited where moving party did not exercise 
due diligence in ascertaining availability). The availability of 
the supplier would have to be the subject of a later hearing 
since the purpose of this continuance was to have time to 
research Meck's claims and determine the supplier's identity and 
location in the first place. Consequently, the lack of 
information regarding the availability of the supplier did not 
negatively impact Ellis' showing of reasonable availability. 
Based on the foregoing, Ellis adequately demonstrated Meck's 
reasonable availability. Meek was housed in a jail adjoining the 
court complex and was therefore immediately accessible and 
available to testify. In addition, the availability of the 
supplier, although unknown to Ellis, was not relevant to the 
availability analysis at that point in the proceeding since it 
was the purpose of the continuance to investigate Meck's 
statements and determine the identity and the availability of the 
supplier in the first place. Given the importance of Meck's 
statements to the truth-finding process, the trial court should 
have exercised its authority to recall the jury and reopen this 
case, even though the jury was already in its deliberations. 
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C. Ellis Established Due Diligence In Preparing For Trial. 
As required under Oliver, Ellis demonstrated due diligence 
in preparing for trial prior to requesting the continuance. 820 
P.2d at 476. In Williams, with regard to justifiable 
continuances, the Supreme Court stated that the "accused must 
timely inform his attorney about matters pertinent to his 
defense." 712 P.2d at 222. In that case, the defendant forged a 
stolen check. Id. The Court charged the defendant with 
knowledge of the absent witness since he received the blank check 
from her and claimed that he thought it was legitimate prior to 
uttering it. Id. The Court reasoned that, "[i]f, in fact, he 
believed that the check was good, he should have disclosed to his 
attorney the circumstances under which he received it." Id.; see 
also Hill v. Dickerson, 839 P.2d 309, 311 (Utah App. 
1992)(continuance not merited where original expert witness 
declined to testify and request was "solely due to [the moving 
party's] own failure to retain and designate a new expert witness 
in a timely manner"). 
Unlike the defendant in Williams, Ellis was not charged with 
knowledge of Meek since he could not and would not have known of 
his existence. First, Ellis did not know Irvin prior to these 
alleged events. R.134[209]. Consequently, Ellis would not know 
Irvin's acquaintances, including Meek and the supplier. Second, 
even though Meck's statements served Ellis' defense theory, Ellis 
could not have anticipated Meek since Meek was not even a remote 
player in the events giving rise to this charge. See, Williams, 
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712 P.2d at 222 (defendant should have known about witness who 
was directly involved in the crime). Hence, unlike the defendant 
in Williams, Ellis, to the best of his knowledge, "timely 
informed his attorney about matters pertinent to his own 
defense." Id. 
The fact that Ellis and Meek were housed in the same jail 
did not impute knowledge to Ellis for purposes of the "diligence" 
analysis here. In James, the defendant was housed in the same 
jail block as the newly discovered witness. 819 P.2d at 794. 
The key witness against the defendant, also an inmate, admitted 
to the new witness that he fabricated his incriminating testimony 
against the defendant. Id.; see supra Point I.A. The new 
witness did not tell the defendant about the key witness' perjury 
until after the trial was over. Id. The Court held that the new 
witness was not "reasonably discoverable." Id. at 793. Although 
the defendant could discover the new witness by interviewing all 
of the people housed with the key witness for evidence of their 
conversations with him, such a task would be "insurmountable" 
given the number of inmates and the "difficulties inherent in 
obtaining visitation and interview privileges at the . . . 
prison." Id. at 794. 
As in James, Ellis could not be expected to interview all 
his fellow inmates to discover if any one of them might have 
information about Irvin. "Due diligence" does not require such 
extraordinary measures. Oliver, 820 P.2d at 476; see also James, 
819 P.2d at 793-94. Moreover, even if it did, Ellis would be 
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exempted in this case since, unlike the key witness in James, 
Irvin was not an inmate and was, therefore, unlikely to have 
connections with anyone else in the jail. Accordingly, the fact 
that Meek and Ellis were housed in the same jail did not render 
Meek "reasonably discoverable" for purposes of the diligence 
analysis. Id. at 793; see also Oliver, 820 P.2d at 476. 
Ellis' diligence is further demonstrated by the fact that he 
vigorously prepared his defense in the absence of Meck's 
statements. In Oliver, this Court affirmed a trial court's 
ruling that a continuance was not warranted partially because the 
defendant banked on an anticipated plea agreement, which he 
rejected at the last minute, and did not prepare his defense 
despite the trial court's admonition to prepare for trial anyway. 
820 P.2d at 477. 
Unlike the defendant in Oliver, Ellis did not exhibit such a 
lack of diligence that a continuance is not warranted here. 
Indeed, Ellis vigorously pursued his defense theory that Irvin 
was party to the drug deal through studied and vigorous cross-
examination of Irvin, the State's four other witnesses, and the 
codefendant, Carter. R. 134,135. Ellis did not hinge even a 
portion of his case upon the hoped-for testimony of Meek since he 
did not know of Meck's existence at the time. Instead, Ellis 
pursued his defense theory predominantly through cross-
examination of Irvin, Carter, and the officers. That Ellis 
prepared his defense to the best of his ability prior to 
requesting the continuance is exemplified by the fact that he 
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rested his case based on such evidence. If Ellis was attempting 
to buy time and delay trial by feigning lack of knowledge of 
Meek, he would have made the request prior to the beginning of 
trial, and certainly before the jury was empaneled, when the 
judge would be more amenable to the idea. Rather, Ellis 
requested the continuance after both parties rested and the jury 
was about to go into deliberation.4 Ellis' motion at this point 
in the proceeding, therefore, evinces his legitimate desire to 
incorporate newly discovered, material evidence into his defense. 
In sum, Ellis diligently prepared for his trial prior to 
requesting the continuance. Oliver, 820 P.2d at 476. Ellis did 
not know Irvin and therefore could not have known about Meek or 
the supplier. Consequently, Ellis did not fail in his duty to 
reveal to his attorney all information pertinent to his defense. 
Id. Moreover, Ellis did not otherwise display negligence in 
preparing for trial, but rather proceeded with zeal to explain 
his defense through cross-examination of all the witnesses known 
to him at the time. Accordingly, Ellis adequately demonstrated 
due diligence meriting a continuance in this case. Id. 
II. ELLIS WAS MATERIALLY PREJUDICED BY THE TRIAL COURT'S 
DENIAL OF A CONTINUANCE; THE OUTCOME OF THE TRIAL WOULD 
HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT HAD THE CONTINUANCE BEEN GRANTED. 
In addition to the foregoing criteria, the Oliver Court 
determined that the party challenging the denial of a continuance 
4
 As noted supra Point I.B., the fact that the jury was 
about to go into deliberation does not mitigate the need for a 
continuance in this case given the importance of Meck's 
information to the fact-finding process. See Duncan, 132 P.2d at 
125. 
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based on newly discovered evidence must make one of two showings 
of prejudice in order to prevail upon appeal: the moving party 
must show either that "it was materially prejudiced by the 
court's denial of the continuance or that the trial result would 
have been different had the continuance been granted." 82 0 P.2d 
at 476 (emphasis added).5 Under either prejudice standard, 
Ellis is entitled to a new trial. 
5
 Oliver appears to be the only case regarding review of a 
trial court's denial of a motion to continue that incorporates a 
prejudice analysis in addition to assessment of the three 
elements set forth in Point I in this brief. See 820 P.2d at 476 
(importing prejudice analysis from State v. Barker, 667 P.2d 108, 
114 (Wash. App. 1983)). Later continuance cases from this Court 
and the Utah Supreme Court have not employed this analysis. See 
Holbrook, 883 P.2d at 298-99; Horton, 848 P.2d at 714-15; State 
v. Cabutatan, 861 P.2d 408, 413-414 (Utah 1993) (limiting 
discussion to three continuance factors, but discussing prejudice 
only in the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
resulting from the denial of the continuance). Accordingly, 
Ellis addresses the prejudice resulting from the denial of the 
continuance in the event that this Court determines that such an 
analysis is appropriate here. Should the Court decide to forgo a 
prejudice analysis, however, Ellis is entitled to reversal and 
remand under the three factors discussed in Point I. 
In the event that the Court does employ a prejudice analysis 
here, it should be noted that the Oliver standard, "that the 
trial result would have been different had the continuance been 
granted," differs from its counterpart in the context of new 
trials and newly discovered evidence. 820 P.2d at 476. With 
regard to requests for a new trial, the reviewing court assesses 
whether the new evidence would "render a different result 
probable on the retrial of the case." James, 819 P.2d at 793 
(citing State v. Gellatlv, 449 P.2d 993, 996 (Utah 1969)); see 
also State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 545 (Utah 1994) (same). The 
Oliver standard, by contrast, does not specifically state that 
the reviewing court looks for new evidence that would proJbaJbly 
affect the outcome. Instead, Oliver merely states that the 
moving party must show that the "result would have been 
different." 820 P.2d at 476. Given the almost impossible burden 
of establishing that a trial outcome would have been different, 
and in light of its counterpart in the context of requests for 
new trials and newly discovered evidence, it follows that the 
Oliver standard also contemplates a review for probable impact on 
trial outcome. 
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First, Ellis is entitled to a new trial because he was 
materially prejudiced by the trial court's denial of a 
continuance. As discussed supra Point I.A-C, Ellis was prevented 
from presenting evidence material to his defense that was not 
otherwise available through cross-examination of any other 
witness or through presentation of any other document. Meck's 
statements were the only independent evidence going to Irvin's 
drug use and purchasing habit. No other evidence proffered at 
trial by either party duplicated or even approximated the 
information that Meek could have provided. 
In denying the continuance, therefore, the trial court 
prevented Ellis from presenting his defense as effectively as he 
could have had the continuance been granted. While Ellis was 
able to communicate his defense theory through cross-examination 
of Irvin, Carter, and the arresting officers, his presentation 
was limited to the extent that it was gleaned predominantly 
through the testimony of the opposing party's witnesses. Where 
Ellis was confined to the State's witnesses in communicating his 
defense theory, Ellis' was hampered by the reluctance and 
adversity implicit in the cross-examined answers of the State's 
witnesses, most notably Irvin, who admitted that he was being 
sarcastic on the stand. R. 134 [27] . The reluctance and 
adversity likely suggested to the jury that Ellis was 
manipulating their testimony in order to escape responsibility. 
Ellis' presentation of his defense was further hampered given 
that the officers testified that they arrested Ellis and Carter 
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as suspects in the theft. R.134[53-72],135[79-89]. Officers are 
authority figures in the community and, therefore the jury may 
have given greater weight to the fact that Gray and Mitchell 
arrested Ellis and Carter, thinking that, in their wisdom and 
experience, the officers knew the men were guilty. This may have 
persuaded the jury to give even less credit to Ellis' defense.6 
Ellis' case was also impacted by codefendant Carter's 
damaging testimony. Carter and Ellis were tried together but 
represented by different attorneys. Carter admitted during 
cross-examination that the supplier he was leading Irvin to was 
actually located several blocks away, arguably too far to walk. 
R.135 [179-80] . The implication of Carter's admission bolstered 
the State's theory that, at minimum, Carter schemed to set up a 
deal with Irvin only to cheat him out of his money, either by 
robbing him at a remote locale or by causing Irvin to become so 
frustrated that he would surrender the money. Carter's 
admission, in turn, implicated Ellis in the alleged scheme 
insofar as Ellis was tagging along with Carter that day. 
R.135 [149,209] . 
A continuance would have allowed Ellis to present his own, 
independent evidence substantiating his defense, untainted by the 
deleterious effects of the sarcasm and adversity exuding from 
Irvin's testimony and that of the State's witnesses during cross-
6
 The trial court gave a jury instruction regarding the 
credibility of witnesses in general, but did not warn against 
giving undue weight to the testimony of officers in particular. 
R. 48 (Jury Instruction No. 9). 
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examination. Specifically, Ellis could have shown through Meck's 
testimony that Irvin was inclined to use drugs and that he had a 
history of buying drugs and therefore engaged in the drug deal on 
this particular occasion. This information would substantiate 
his case and'lend it more legitimacy in the minds of the jurors. 
Moreover, Ellis would have been able to rehabilitate his 
defense after Carter's damaging admission which implicated Ellis 
in the scheme to steal Irvin's money. Ellis and Carter already 
testified that Ellis did not know Irvin. R.135 [149-50,209] . 
Their testimony also established that they were friends who had 
not seen each other in a long time, as opposed to partners-in-
crime who always hung out together looking for ways to cause 
trouble. R.135[149,208]. In addition, they established that 
Carter excused himself from his conversation with Ellis to speak 
with Irvin alone and that Ellis was not privy to the ensuing drug 
deal between Carter and Irvin. R.135[149,208-09]. In light of 
this evidence, Meck's statements would dispel Carter's damaging 
admission which implicated Ellis by reinforcing that the drug 
deal was between Irvin and Carter, and that Ellis was not a 
culpable party since he was not aware of the deal and was with 
Carter coincidentally when the deal went sour and Irvin made his 
allegations. Absent the continuance however, Ellis was not able 
to substantiate his defense with independent, corroborative 
evidence. Accordingly, Ellis was materially prejudiced by the 
denial of the continuance such that a new trial is necessary in 
this case. 
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Ellis is also entitled to a new trial on the alternative 
ground that his trial outcome was changed by the denial of the 
continuance. See Oliver, 820 P.2d at 476. Specifically, the 
evidence against Ellis did not overwhelmingly suggest his guilt. 
Hence, the impact of the material prejudice discussed above 
likely changed the outcome of his trial. James, 819 P.2d at 795. 
In James, the Supreme Court held that the defendant probably 
would not have been convicted had the newly discovered evidence 
been presented at trial since the new evidence indicated that 
defendant did not kill the victim intentionally or knowingly as 
required for a murder conviction, but perhaps recklessly or 
negligently. 819 P.2d at 795. The Court so held because the 
other evidence against the defendant, although sufficient, was 
neither "overwhelming or compelling" and, therefore, "susceptible 
of differing interpretations." Id. The Court concluded that in 
light of the new evidence, "the jury would have had a reasonable 
doubt as to whether defendant had the requisite intent to commit 
murder." Id. I 
As in James, the new evidence that Meek could provide would 
have changed the outcome of trial since the other evidence 
against Ellis was inconclusive. For example, there is no direct 
evidence linking Ellis to the alleged crime other than Irvin's 
testimony. The evidence establishing the critical events that 
transpired between Irvin, Carter and Ellis consists solely of 
Irvin's word against the testimony of Ellis and Carter. Where 
the evidence against a defendant consists only of the defendant's 
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word against that of a key opposing witness, the probability of a 
different outcome in light of the new evidence is particularly 
great. See, e.g.. State v. Perez, 946 P.2d 724, 732-33 (Utah 
App. 1997) (absent prosecutorial statement bolstering credibility 
of informant witness, defendant's trial outcome would be 
different since evidence of vital fact consisted of defendant's 
word against that of informant witness and no other corroborative 
evidence existed). 
Moreover, the evidence strongly suggests, and Carter admits, 
that Carter and Irvin alone were involved in the altercation 
resulting in Irvin7s allegation, and that Ellis was only tagging 
along but not privy to the deal. R.135[149-50,208-09]. For 
example, no contraband or other incriminating items were found on 
Ellis' person. Rather, the allegedly stolen money was found on 
Carter, not Ellis.7 R.135 [87]. 
In light of the inconclusive evidence and the material 
prejudice resulting from the denial of the continuance, it is 
probable that the jury opted to convict Ellis in this case. The 
equivocal evidence against Ellis rendered it "susceptible to 
differing interpretations," especially when considered in light 
of the evidence suggesting Ellis' innocence. James, 819 P.2d at 
795. Consequently, the likelihood that Meck's information would 
have persuaded the jury to acquit Ellis is high since it would 
7
 Even Judge Henriod at sentencing, upon Ellis' motion to 
reduce the second degree offense to a third degree offense, 
acknowledged that the facts of this case do not overwhelmingly 
point to his guilt when he stated, "[this case] doesn't smell 
like a second degree felony." R. 138 [13] . 
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